

Appeal Nos. 21-55178(L), 21-55180

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RICHARD C. GOUNAUD,
Defendant-Appellant
and

JOCELYN M. MURPHY; MICHAEL S. MURPHY; RMR ASSET
MANAGEMENT COMPANY; BRUCE A. BROEKHUIZEN; DOUGLAS J.
DERRYBERRY; DAVID R. FROST; NEIL P. KELLY; JOHN M.
KIRSCHENBAUM; DAVID S. LUTTBEG; TIMOTHY J. McALOON; RALPH
M. RICCARDI; DEWEY T. TRAN; PHILIP A. WEINER,
Defendants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding
Orig. Case No. 3:18-cv-01895-AJB-LL

**BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE INVESTOR CHOICE ADVOCATES
NETWORK IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC**

Nick Morgan, Bar No. 166441
nicolasmorgan@paulhastings.com
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
515 South Flower Street
Twenty-Fifth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90071-2228
Telephone: 1(213) 683-6000
Facsimile: 1(213) 627-0705
Attorney for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.....	2
DISCUSSION	3
I. The Panel’s Opinion Departs from <i>Feng</i>	3
II. The Panel’s New Two-Factor Test may Require Broker Registration for Large Swathes of The Market not Currently Registered.....	5
A. The Panel’s Opinion May Require Investment Clubs to Register as Brokers	5
B. The Panel’s Opinion Could be Read to Require Some Investment Advisers to Register as Brokers	8
III. An Overbroad Interpretation of “Broker” will Impose Unnecessary Costs and Chill Economic Activity	10
CONCLUSION	12
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES	14
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.....	14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
Cases	
<i>Levine v. SEC</i> , 407 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2005)	9
<i>SEC v. Feng</i> , 935 F.3d 721 (9th Cir. 2019)	3
<i>SEC v. Hansen</i> , No. 83 Civ. 3692, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17835 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1984)	3, 4, 8, 10
Statutes	
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A)	3
Exchange Act	
of 1934 § 3(a)(4) and 15(a).....	3
§ 3(a)(4)’s.....	3
§ 11(a).....	9
§ 15.....	10
§ 15(a).....	9, 10
Other Authorities	
Adam Ritt, <i>How to Start a Stock Investment Club</i>	7
David A. Lipton, <i>A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration</i> , 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 899 (1987).....	3, 11
SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 1229456 (Mar. 26, 2013).....	9
SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 1279194 (Mar. 28, 2013).....	9
Securities Industry Association, <i>The Costs of Compliance In the U.S.</i> <i>Securities Industry</i> (Feb. 2006).....	11

INTRODUCTION

The panel in this case holds in relevant part that Appellants were required to register with Appellee Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as brokers because Appellants put a third party’s capital at risk and acted as his agents. The panel’s opinion appears at times to abandon the long-standing framework for determining whether conduct creates an obligation to register as a broker. While ostensibly deriving its result directly from statutory text, the panel’s new framework in fact goes beyond what the statutory text supports (and appears to exceed any standard articulated by the SEC in this case). Ambiguities in the panel’s opinion could be read to create a new, dramatically sweeping broker registration obligation for segments of the economy that even the SEC has not suggested require such registration.

Amicus Investor Choice Advocates Network (“ICAN”) respectfully urges this Court to grant Appellants’ petition for rehearing *en banc*. Regardless whether the outcome of this particular case changes, the Court should not adopt a rule that would require SEC broker registration for anyone who shares profits and losses with a third party resulting from securities transactions processed through a registered securities broker.

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus curiae Investor Choice Advocates Network (“ICAN”) is a nonprofit organization seeking to expand investor opportunities to participate in the capital markets and reduce regulatory barriers to entry to those markets. ICAN is concerned that the panel’s opinion will (perhaps inadvertently) create just such a barrier to participation in the capital markets. Requiring registration as a securities broker imposes costs, and the panel’s ruling creates ambiguity regarding who must register and bear those costs. As a result, some potential market participants will simply not participate in some investment activity out of fear of violating an ambiguous regulatory requirement. Other market participants will incur the expense necessary to register as securities brokers in situations where such registration yields no corresponding benefits. Preventing obligations (or the perception of potential obligations) to register as a broker beyond what the federal securities laws require is an issue of great importance for the public and ICAN.

All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No party’s counsel or any other person other than amicus or its counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.

DISCUSSION

I. THE PANEL’S OPINION DEPARTS FROM *FENG*

The panel’s opinion opens with a laudable premise: beginning its analysis with the relevant statutory language rather than with the significant body of case law that has developed around the statutory language. Opn. 16 and 17. The panel contrasts the “broad,” case-driven “totality-of-circumstances approach” set forth in *SEC v. Feng*, 935 F.3d 721, 732 (9th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (applying *SEC v. Hansen*, No. 83 Civ. 3692, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17835, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1984) (the “*Hansen* factors”) with the “straightforward” language in Sections 3(a)(4) and 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). *Id.*

As the panel’s opinion notes, Exchange Act Section 3(a)(4)’s definition of “broker” is very simple: “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (quoted at Opn. 16). Although the SEC did not request the panel to reject the *Hansen* factors, the panel’s opinion “does not rely on the *Hansen* factors,” and the concurring opinion would jettison the *Hansen* factors altogether. Opn. at 22 and 36. However, the *Hansen* factors arose to fill gaps left by the statutory definition’s superficial simplicity. [David A. Lipton, *A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration*, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 899 \(1987\)](#) (describing multi-decade development of broker

definition and concluding, “Initially, the answer to that question (of who is a broker) appears relatively simple. . . . Unfortunately, this common understanding of the broker-dealer does not provide guidance for determining broker status in other than the customary securities industry situation”).

The panel’s opinion implicitly recognizes that the statutory definition alone provides insufficient structure to address the facts of the present case. Rather than limiting its analysis to the bare statutory language, the panel’s opinion creates what appears to be a new, two-factor test in place of the *Hansen* factors:

“First . . . when Appellants traded securities and shared a portion of the profits and losses with Riccardi, they traded for his account because another person—Riccardi—bore some risk of a loss.”

“Second, Appellants traded ‘for’ Riccardi because they acted as his ‘agents.’ . . . [because] Appellants acted on Riccardi’s behalf and subject to his control.”

Opn. at 17 & 19.

Unfortunately, replacing the seven *Hansen* factors with what would undoubtedly become known in subsequent cases as the two *Murphy* factors does little to assist predictability of results and may do harm by inadvertently including business models that no one (including, apparently, the SEC) believes require registering as a broker.

II. THE PANEL’S NEW TWO-FACTOR TEST MAY REQUIRE BROKER REGISTRATION FOR LARGE SWATHES OF THE MARKET NOT CURRENTLY REGISTERED

The panel’s opinion may be read to require broker registration for (1) a group of individuals sharing trading in profits and losses, (2) when one or more members of such a group executes trades through a prime brokerage account. Such a registration requirement would come as a surprise to many investment clubs and investment advisers.

A. The Panel’s Opinion May Require Investment Clubs to Register as Brokers

The SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy describes an investment club as “a group of people who pool their money to invest together. Club members generally study different investments and then make investment decisions together – for example, the group might buy or sell based on a member vote.”¹ The SEC OIEA goes on to advise that while the “SEC generally does not regulate investment clubs,” certain regulatory requirements may exist depending on the structure of a specific club. The listed potential “registration requirements” include (1) registration of the offer and sale of club membership interests, (2) registration of the club as an investment company, and (3) registration as an

¹ “Investment Clubs and the SEC,” available at <https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsinvclubhtm.html>

investment adviser for any person paid for providing advice regarding the club's investments." Conspicuously absent from list of "registration requirements" is the possibility that the member tasked with executing the club's transaction through a brokerage firm must herself be registered as a broker.

To be sure, the SEC OIEA description of potential investment club "registration requirements" is not meant to be legal advice from the SEC, but the absence of any mention that investment club members may need to register as securities brokers is telling: it would be more than surprising to suggest a broker registration requirement for a member of a group of people who share in the profits and losses generated from an investment pool because that person executed transactions for the group.

Such a registration requirement would apparently also surprise the National Association of Investors (a/k/a BetterInvesting), a national 501(c)(3) nonprofit established in 1951 that "has helped more than 5 million people from all walks of life learn how to improve their financial future."² In its publication, "How to Start a Stock Investment Club," BetterInvesting observes that "investing in the stock market is easier when sharing investing ideas and pooling investments as part of an investment club," and "When club members pool money and make investment decisions, the club treasurer can endorse member checks over to the club's

² BetterInvesting: Who We Are, available at <https://www.betterinvesting.org/>.

broker.” Adam Ritt, *How to Start a Stock Investment Club*, BetterInvesting (Aug. 5, 2019).³ Nowhere does BetterInvesting suggest to its members that club members who execute trades through the club’s brokerage account should register as brokers themselves. Again, BetterInvesting is not providing legal advice to its members, but the absence of any reference to the possibility that broker registration might be required suggests that the longstanding national leader in this area does not perceive that such a registration requirement risk is worth a passing mention.

One nonprofit, CLIMB (Communities Learning to Invest and Mobilize for Business), highlights the important role investment clubs can play in creatively and effectively connecting underserved youth and families to financial education programs and resources.⁴ Lack of financial education and literacy is a significant public policy issue: for example, one recent report found that only 31% of baby boomer generation workers said they have a great deal or quite a bit of understanding of asset allocation principles. *Id.*

The panel’s opinion would create uncertainty for investment club members who execute trades through a brokerage account and share profits and losses with

³ Available at <https://www.betterinvesting.org/learn-about-investing/investor-education/joining-an-investment-club/how-to-start-a-stock-investment-club>.

⁴ Richard Eisenberg, *Why You May Want to Start, or Join, An Investment Club*, Forbes (Aug. 13, 2021), available at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2021/08/13/why-you-may-want-to-start-or-join-an-investment-club/?sh=2aa4f6da9bdb>

other members. Imposing a broker registration requirement (or the perception that one might exist) would decrease learning opportunities and worsen financial literacy. For the avoidance of doubt on this issue, the Court should grant Appellants' petition for rehearing *en banc*.

B. The Panel's Opinion Could be Read to Require Some Investment Advisers to Register as Brokers

The panel's opinion concludes that because Riccardi shared in the economic risks of Appellants' trades, Appellants traded for Riccardi's account and thus acted as unregistered brokers. Opn. at 18. Having relegated the *Hansen* factor of "transaction based compensation" to dicta (Opn. at 22), the panel cites to an inapposite speech by former SEC Division of Trading and Markets (the "Division") Chief Counsel David Blass in support of the idea that sharing in profits and losses is the same as "transaction based compensation," but Mr. Blass's speech does not support that conclusion. Opn. at 22 (quoting Blass, *A Few Observations in the Private Fund Space*, "compensation that depends on the outcome or size of the securities transaction"). While Mr. Blass's speech does not support the panel's conclusion equating profit and loss sharing with "transaction based compensation," the panel's reliance on the speech highlights a market segment that may be impacted by the panel's opinion: the private fund space.

Rather than relying on the *Hansen* "transaction based compensation" factor, the panel's opinion instead looks for support of its conclusion from a Third Circuit

opinion interpreting an Exchange Act provision not at issue in this case. Opn. at 17 (citing *Levine v. SEC*, 407 F.3d 178, 183-184 (3d Cir. 2005) and Exchange Act § 11(a)). However, the panel did not have to travel so far afield to encounter very common situations in which the very same SEC staff member relied on by the panel twice (Opn. at 16 and 22), Mr. Blass, determined that sharing in the risk of trades did not create the need for securities broker registration.

In a pair of “no-action letters” issued by Mr. Blass, the Division stated that it would not recommend enforcement action under Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act if the parties engaged in the described activities without registering as brokers.⁵ Of relevance here, the Division found particularly compelling the fact that the investment adviser “will receive compensation equal to a portion of the increase in value, if any, of the investment as calculated at the termination of the investment in the Investment Vehicle (*i.e.*, carried interest).” AngelList No Action Letter at 3. The Division further notes that an adviser who receives such carried interest compensation “will not receive any transaction-based compensation.” *Id.* In other words, receiving compensation in the form of a portion of profits is not “transaction-based compensation” in the context of private funds and does not

⁵ AngelList LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 1279194 (Mar. 28, 2013) (“AngelList No Action Letter”); FundersClub Inc. & FundersClub Mgmt. LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 1229456 (Mar. 26, 2013) (“FundersClub No Action Letter”). Contrary to the statement in Opn. fn 6, No Action letters are statements by SEC staff rather than “clarification from the SEC” itself.

cause an investment adviser to become a broker requiring registration under Exchange Act Section 15(a).

While the facts of the current case can be distinguished from the facts present in the AngelList and FundersClub No Action Letters (*e.g.*, presence of a registered investment adviser; profits and losses shared on individual transactions rather than from a pooled investment), the panel’s opinion leaves open the possibility that it could be used in the future to expand the broker registration requirement into the private fund space.

The foregoing example involving carried interest compensation in a pooled investment is only one example of shared profits and losses in the investment adviser space. To conclude, as the panel’s dicta does, that sharing in transaction profits and losses is equivalent to “transaction based compensation” under *Hansen*, creating an obligation to register as a broker, would upend long-standing economic relationships that heretofore have not required such registration.

III. AN OVERBROAD INTERPRETATION OF “BROKER” WILL IMPOSE UNNECESSARY COSTS AND CHILL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Requiring SEC registration as a broker comes at considerable burden and expense.

Registration as a broker under Section 15 of the Exchange Act “triggers numerous other sections of that Act, as well as rules promulgated pursuant to those

sections.” Lipton, *A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration*, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 907. Among other things, registered brokers must file a Form BD and a statement of financial condition; registering brokers and all natural persons associated with them must meet regulatory standards of competency and training by, for example, adequate performance on examinations administered by self-regulatory organizations. Once registered, a broker must comply with specific record keeping, financial compliance, and financial reporting requirements, including maintenance of numerous records regarding, among other things, securities transactions, position held in securities, orders received and given, as well as the receipt and disbursement of various funds. Brokers must prepare and file quarter financial reports and certified annual reports. Brokers are subject to rigorous net worth and capital requirements, must join an insurance program to cover certain customer losses, and must join a self-regulatory organization. This incomplete list of regulatory burdens imposed on brokers should not be imposed lightly.

One industry study and report concluded that firms in the securities industry spent \$23.2 billion in 2004 on regulatory compliance, and “[t]he costs incurred by firms in the securities industry to comply with the increasing volume of regulatory and legislative initiatives may ultimately be passed on to investors through higher prices and fewer choices.” Securities Industry Association, *The Costs of*

Compliance In the U.S. Securities Industry (Feb. 2006).⁶ In short, an overly-inclusive definition of “broker” imposes regulatory costs. To be sure, those costs are borne in part by those who choose to be securities “brokers,” but the costs are also borne indirectly by those who forgo becoming securities brokers or forgo economic activity that falls outside any reasonable definition of the term “broker” because of a fear created by an ambiguous definition in the hands of an assertive regulator. This case – a case in which no investor was harmed and no investor ever sought the protections that the panel’s opinion seeks to impose – is not the right case in which to create an overly expansive definition of the term “broker.”

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this brief and the petition for rehearing, amicus curiae ICAN respectfully asks this Court to grant Appellants’ petition for rehearing *en banc*.

⁶ Available at <https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/costofcompliancesurveyreport1.pdf>

DATED: November 28, 2022 PAUL HASTINGS LLP

By: /s/ Nicolas Morgan

NICOLAS MORGAN, Bar No. 166441

nicolasmorgan@paulhastings.com

515 South Flower Street

Twenty-Fifth Floor

Los Angeles, California 90071-2228

Telephone: 1(213) 683-6000

Facsimile: 1(213) 627-0705

Attorney for Amici Curiae

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

There are no related cases pending in this Court.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief has been prepared using proportionately double-spaced 14 point Times New Roman typeface. According to the “Word Count” feature in my Microsoft Word for Windows software, this brief contains 3061 words up to and including the signature lines that follow the brief’s conclusion.

I declare under penalty of perjury that this Certificate of Compliance is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on November 28, 2022.

/s/ Nicolas Morgan

Nicolas Morgan
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
515 South Flower Street
Twenty-Fifth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90071-2228
Telephone: 1(213) 683-6000
Facsimile: 1(213) 627-0705
Attorney for Amici Curiae

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 28, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.

Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate CM/ECF system.

Date: November 28, 2022

/s/ Nicolas Morgan

Nicolas Morgan
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
515 South Flower Street
Twenty-Fifth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90071-2228
Telephone: 1(213) 683-6000
Facsimile: 1(213) 627-0705
Attorney for Amici Curiae